000			08811nam a22002897a 4500
001			0011683
003			KOHA_MİRAKIL
005			20260207001826.0
007			ta
008			090729b1995 us |||gr||||#||||0|eng |
020			_a9780195102680 _c189,85
040			_aTR-BiSEU _btur _cTR-BiSEU _erda
041	0		_aeng
044			_cus
050			_aHB172 _b.M37 1995
100	1		_aMas-Colell, Andreu..
245	1		_aMicroeconomic theory/ _cAndreu. Mas-Colell ; Andreu Mas-Colell, Michael D. Whinston, and Jerry R. Green.
264		1	_aNew York : _bOxford University Press _c1995
300			_axvii, 981 sayfa: illustreted; 26 cm.
336			_ametin _btxt _2rdacontent
337			_aaracısız _bn _2rdamedia
338			_acilt _bnc _2rdacarrier
500			_aIncludes bibliographical references and index.
505			_aPart I: INDIVIDUAL DECISION-MAKING _xIntroduction to Part I _x1. Preference and Choice _xA. Introduction _xB. Preference Relations _xC. Choice Rules _xD. The Relationship between Preference Relations and Choice Rules _xExercises _x2. Consumer Choice _xA. Introduction _xB. Commodities _xC. The Consumption Set _xD. Competitive Budgets _xE. Demand Functions and Comparartive Statics _xF. The Weak Axiom of Revealed Preference and the Law of Demand _xExercises _x3. Classical Demand Theory _xA. Introduction _xB. Preference Relations: Basic Properties _xC. Preference and Utility _xD. The Utility Maximization Problem _xE. The Expenditure Minimization Problem _xF. Duality: A Mathematical Introduction _xG. Relationships between Demand, Indirect Utility, and Expenditure Functions _xH. Integrability _xI. Welfare Evaluation of Economic Changes _xJ. The Strong Axiom of Revealed Preference _xAppendix: Continuity and Differentiability Properties of Walrasian Demand _xExercises _x4. Aggregate Demand _xA. Introduction _xB. Aggregate Demand and Aggregate Wealth _xC. Aggregate Demand and the Weak Axiom _xD. Aggregate Demand and the Existence of a Representative Consumer _xAppendix: Regularizing Effects of Aggregation _xExercises _x5. Production _xA. Introduction _xB. Production Sets _xC. Profit Maximization and Cost Minimization _xD. The Geometry of Cost and Supply in the Single Output Case _xE. Aggregation _xF. Efficient Production _xG. Remarks on the Objectives of the Firm _xAppendix: The Linear Activity Model _xExercises _x6. Choice under Uncertainty _xA. Introduction _xB. Expected Utility Theory _xC. Money Lotteries and Risk Aversion _xD. Comparison of Payoff Distributions in Terms of Return and Risk _xE. State Dependent Utility _xF. Subjective Probability Theory _xExercises _xPart II: GAME THEORY _xIntroduction to Part II _x7. Basic Elements of Non-Cooperative Games _xA. Introduction _xB. What is a Game? _xC. The Extensive Form Representation of a Game _xD. Strategies and the Normal Form Representation of a Game _xE. Randomized Choices _xExercises _x8. Simultaneous-Move Games _xA. Introduction _xB. Dominant and Dominated Strategies _xC. Rationalizable Strategies _xD. Nash Equilibrium _xE. Games of Incomplete Information: Bayesian Nash Equilibrium _xF. The Possibility of Mistakes: Trembling-Hand Perfection _xAppendix: Existence of Nash Equilibrium _xExercises _x9. Dynamic Games _xA. Introduction _xB. Sequential Rationality, Backwards Induction, and Subgame Perfection _xC. Sequential Rationality and Out-of-Equilibrium Beliefs _xD. Reasonable Beliefs, Forward Induction, and Normal Form Refinements _xAppendix A: Finite and Infinite Horizon Bilateral Bargaining _xAppendix B: Extensive Form Trembling-Hand Perfection _xExercises _xPart III: MARKET EQUILIBRIUM AND MARKET FAILURE _xIntroduction to Part III _x10. Competitive Markets _xA. Introduction _xB. Pareto Optimality and Competitive Equilibria _xC. Partial Equilibrium Competitive Analysis _xD. The Fundamental Welfare Theorems in a Partial Equilibrium Context _xE. Welfare Analysis in the Partial Equilibrium Model _xF. Free-Entry and Long-Run Competitive Equilibria _xG. Concluding Remarks on Partial Equilibrium Analysis _xExercises _x11. Externalities and Public Goods _xA. Introduction _xB. A Simple Bilateral Externality _xC. Public Goods _xD. Multilateral Externalities _xE. Private Information and Second-Best Solutions _xAppendix: Non-Convexities and the Theory of Externalities _xExercises _x12. Market Power _xA. Introduction _xB. Monopoly Pricing _xC. Static Models of Oligopoly _xD. Repeated Interaction _xE. Entry _xF. The Competitive Limit _xG. Strategic Precommitments to Affect Future Competition _xAppendix A: Infinitely Repeated Games and the Folk Theorem _xAppendix B: Strategic Entry Deterrence and Accommodation _xExercises _x13. Adverse Selection, Signalling, and Screening _xA. Introduction _xB. Informational Asymmetries and Adverse Selection _xC. Signalling _xD. Screening _xAppendix: Reasonable-Beliefs Refinements in Signalling Games _xExercises _x14. The Principal-Agent Problem _xA. Introduction _xB. Hidden Actions (Moral Hazard) _xC. Hidden Information (and Monopolistic Screening) _xD. Hidden Actions and Hidden Information: Hybrid Models _xAppendix A: Multiple Effort Levels in the Hidden Action Model _xAppendix B: A Formal Solution of the Principal-Agent Problem with Hidden Information _xExercises _xPart IV: GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM _xIntroduction to Part IV _x15. General Equilibrium Theory: Some Examples _xA. Introduction _xB. Pure Exchange: The Edgeworth Box _xC. The One Consumer-One Producer Economy _xD. The 2x2 Production Model _xE. General versus Partial Equilibrium Theory _xExercises _x16. Equilibrium and Its Basic Welfare Properties _xA. Introduction _xB. The Basic Model and Definitions _xC. The First Fundamental Theorem of Welfare Economics _xD. The Second Fundamental Theorem of Welfare Economics _xE. Pareto Optimality and Social Welfare Optima _xF. First-Order Conditions for Pareto Optimality _xG. Some Applications _xAppendix: Technical Properties of the Set of Feasible Allocations _xExercises _x17. The Positive Theory of Equilibrium _xA. Introduction _xB. Equilibrium: Definitions and Basic Equations _xC. Existence of Walrasian Equilibrium _xD. Local Uniqueness and the Index Theorem _xE. Anything Goes: The Sonnenschein-Mantel-Debreu Theorem _xF. Uniqueness of Equilibria _xG. Comparative Statics Analysis _xH. Tatonnement Stability _xI. Large Economies and Non-Convexities _xAppendix A: Characterizing Equilibrium through Welfare Equations _xAppendix B: A General Approach to the Existence of Walrasian Equilibrium _xExercises _x18. Some Foundations for Competitive Equilibria _xA. Introduction _xB. Core and Equilibria _xC. Non-Cooperative Foundations of Walrasian Equilibria _xD. The Limits to Redistribution _xE. Equilibrium and the Marginal Productivity Principle _xAppendix: Cooperative Game Theory _xExercises _x19. General Equilibrium under Uncertainty _xA. Introduction _xB. A Market Economy with Contingent Commodities: Description _xC. Arrow-Debreu Equilibrium _xD. Sequential Trade _xE. Asset Markets _xF. Incomplete Markets _xG. Firm Behavior in General Equilibrium Models under Uncertainty _xH. Imperfect Information _xExercises _x20. Equilibrium and Time _xA. Introduction _xB. Intertemporal Utility _xC. Intertemporal Production and Efficiency _xD. Equilibrium: The One-Consumer Case _xE. Stationary Programs, Interest Rates, and Golden Rules _xF. Dynamics _xG. Equilibrium: Several Consumers _xH. Overlapping Generations _xI. Remarks on Non-Equilibrium Dynamics: Tatonnement and Learning _xExercises _xPart V: WELFARE ECONOMICS AND INCENTIVES _xIntroduction to Part V _x21. Social Choice Theory _xA. Introduction _xB. A Special Case: Social Preferences over Two Alternatives _xC. The General Case: Arrow's Impossibility Theorem _xD. Some Possibility Results: Restricted Domains _xE. Social Choice Functions _xExercises _x22. Elements of Welfare Economics and Axiomatic Bargaining _xA. Introduction _xB. Utility Possibility Sets _xC. Social Welfare Functions and Social Optima _xD. Invariance Properties of Social Welfare Functions _xE. The Axiomatic Bargaining Approach _xF. Coalitional Bargaining: The Shapley Value _xExercises _x23. Incentives and Mechanism Design _xA. Introduction _xB. The Mechanism Design Problem _xC. Dominant Strategy Implementation _xD. Bayesian Implementation _xE. Participation Constraints _xF. Optimal Bayesian Mechanisms _xAppendix A: Implementation and Multiple Equilibria _xAppendix B: Implementation in Environments with Complete Information _xExercises _xMathematical Appendix _xA. Introduction _xB. Homogeneous Functions and Euler's Formula _xC. Concave and Quasiconcave Functions _xD. Matrices: Negative (Semi)Definiteness and Other Properties _xE. The Implicit Function Theorem _xF. Continuous Functions and Compact Sets _xG. Convex Sets and Separating Hyperplanes _xH. Correspondences _xI. Fixed Point Theorems _xJ. Unconstrained Maximization _xK. Constrained Maximization _xL. The Envelope Theorem _xM. Linear Programming _xN. Dynamic Programming _x
650		0	_aMicroeconomics. _91881
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