MARC details
| 000 -BAŞLIK |
|---|
| Sabit Uzunluktaki Kontrol Alanı |
08811nam a22002897a 4500 |
| 001 - KONTROL NUMARASI |
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| Control Dosyası |
0011683 |
| 003 - KONTROL NUMARASI KİMLİĞİ |
|---|
| Kontrol Alanı |
KOHA_MİRAKIL |
| 005 - EN SON İŞLEM TARİHİ ve ZAMANI |
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| Kontrol Alanı |
20260207001826.0 |
| 007 - FİZİKSEL TANIM SABİT ALAN - GENEL BİLGİ |
|---|
| Sabit uzunluklu kontrol alanı |
ta |
| 008 - SABİT UZUNLUKTAKİ VERİ ÖGELERİ - GENEL BİLGİ |
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| Sabit Alan |
090729b1995 us |||gr||||#||||0|eng | |
| 020 ## - ISBN - ULUSLARARASI STANDART KİTAP NUMARASI |
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| Isbn |
9780195102680 |
| Kullanılabilirlik koşulları |
189,85 |
| 040 ## - KATALOGLAMA KAYNAĞI |
|---|
| Özgün Kataloglama Kurumu |
TR-BiSEU |
| Kataloglama Dili |
tur |
| Çeviri Kurumu |
TR-BiSEU |
| Açıklama Kuralları |
rda |
| 041 0# - DİL KODU |
|---|
| Metin ya da ses kaydının dil kodu |
eng |
| 044 ## - YAYINLAYAN/ÜRETEN KURULUŞUN ÜLKE KODU |
|---|
| ISO country code |
us |
| 050 ## - SINIFLAMA ve YER NUMARASI |
|---|
| Sınıflama Numarası |
HB172 |
| Yer Numarası |
.M37 1995 |
| 100 1# - KİŞİ ADI |
|---|
| Yazar Adı (Kişi adı) |
Mas-Colell, Andreu.. |
| 245 1# - ESER ADI BİLDİRİMİ |
|---|
| Başlık |
Microeconomic theory/ |
| Sorumluluk Bildirimi |
Andreu. Mas-Colell ; Andreu Mas-Colell, Michael D. Whinston, and Jerry R. Green. |
| 264 #1 - ÜRERİM, YAYIN, DAĞITIM ve TELİF BİLDİRİMİ |
|---|
| Yayın yeri |
New York : |
| Yayınlayan |
Oxford University Press |
| Yayın tarihi |
1995 |
| 300 ## - FİZİKSEL TANIMLAMA |
|---|
| Sayfa, Cilt vb. |
xvii, 981 sayfa: illustreted; 26 cm. |
| 336 ## - İÇERİK TÜRÜ |
|---|
| Content type term |
metin |
| Content type code |
txt |
| Source |
rdacontent |
| 337 ## - MEDYA TÜRÜ |
|---|
| Media type term |
aracısız |
| Media type code |
n |
| Source |
rdamedia |
| 338 ## - TAŞIYICI TÜRÜ |
|---|
| Carrier type term |
cilt |
| Carrier type code |
nc |
| Source |
rdacarrier |
| 500 ## - GENEL NOT |
|---|
| Genel Not |
Includes bibliographical references and index. |
| 505 ## - İÇİNDEKİLER NOTU |
|---|
| İçindekiler Notu |
Part I: INDIVIDUAL DECISION-MAKING |
| 650 #0 - KONU BAŞLIĞI EK GİRİŞ - KONU TERİMİ |
|---|
| Konusal terim veya coğrafi ad |
Microeconomics. |
| 9 (RLIN) |
1881 |
| 942 ## - EK GİRİŞ ÖGELERİ (KOHA) |
|---|
| Source of classification or shelving scheme |
Library of Congress Classification |
| Koha item type |
Book |
| 505 ## - İÇİNDEKİLER NOTU |
|---|
| -- |
Introduction to Part I |
| -- |
1. Preference and Choice |
| -- |
A. Introduction |
| -- |
B. Preference Relations |
| -- |
C. Choice Rules |
| -- |
D. The Relationship between Preference Relations and Choice Rules |
| -- |
Exercises |
| -- |
2. Consumer Choice |
| -- |
A. Introduction |
| -- |
B. Commodities |
| -- |
C. The Consumption Set |
| -- |
D. Competitive Budgets |
| -- |
E. Demand Functions and Comparartive Statics |
| -- |
F. The Weak Axiom of Revealed Preference and the Law of Demand |
| -- |
Exercises |
| -- |
3. Classical Demand Theory |
| -- |
A. Introduction |
| -- |
B. Preference Relations: Basic Properties |
| -- |
C. Preference and Utility |
| -- |
D. The Utility Maximization Problem |
| -- |
E. The Expenditure Minimization Problem |
| -- |
F. Duality: A Mathematical Introduction |
| -- |
G. Relationships between Demand, Indirect Utility, and Expenditure Functions |
| -- |
H. Integrability |
| -- |
I. Welfare Evaluation of Economic Changes |
| -- |
J. The Strong Axiom of Revealed Preference |
| -- |
Appendix: Continuity and Differentiability Properties of Walrasian Demand |
| -- |
Exercises |
| -- |
4. Aggregate Demand |
| -- |
A. Introduction |
| -- |
B. Aggregate Demand and Aggregate Wealth |
| -- |
C. Aggregate Demand and the Weak Axiom |
| -- |
D. Aggregate Demand and the Existence of a Representative Consumer |
| -- |
Appendix: Regularizing Effects of Aggregation |
| -- |
Exercises |
| -- |
5. Production |
| -- |
A. Introduction |
| -- |
B. Production Sets |
| -- |
C. Profit Maximization and Cost Minimization |
| -- |
D. The Geometry of Cost and Supply in the Single Output Case |
| -- |
E. Aggregation |
| -- |
F. Efficient Production |
| -- |
G. Remarks on the Objectives of the Firm |
| -- |
Appendix: The Linear Activity Model |
| -- |
Exercises |
| -- |
6. Choice under Uncertainty |
| -- |
A. Introduction |
| -- |
B. Expected Utility Theory |
| -- |
C. Money Lotteries and Risk Aversion |
| -- |
D. Comparison of Payoff Distributions in Terms of Return and Risk |
| -- |
E. State Dependent Utility |
| -- |
F. Subjective Probability Theory |
| -- |
Exercises |
| -- |
Part II: GAME THEORY |
| -- |
Introduction to Part II |
| -- |
7. Basic Elements of Non-Cooperative Games |
| -- |
A. Introduction |
| -- |
B. What is a Game? |
| -- |
C. The Extensive Form Representation of a Game |
| -- |
D. Strategies and the Normal Form Representation of a Game |
| -- |
E. Randomized Choices |
| -- |
Exercises |
| -- |
8. Simultaneous-Move Games |
| -- |
A. Introduction |
| -- |
B. Dominant and Dominated Strategies |
| -- |
C. Rationalizable Strategies |
| -- |
D. Nash Equilibrium |
| -- |
E. Games of Incomplete Information: Bayesian Nash Equilibrium |
| -- |
F. The Possibility of Mistakes: Trembling-Hand Perfection |
| -- |
Appendix: Existence of Nash Equilibrium |
| -- |
Exercises |
| -- |
9. Dynamic Games |
| -- |
A. Introduction |
| -- |
B. Sequential Rationality, Backwards Induction, and Subgame Perfection |
| -- |
C. Sequential Rationality and Out-of-Equilibrium Beliefs |
| -- |
D. Reasonable Beliefs, Forward Induction, and Normal Form Refinements |
| -- |
Appendix A: Finite and Infinite Horizon Bilateral Bargaining |
| -- |
Appendix B: Extensive Form Trembling-Hand Perfection |
| -- |
Exercises |
| -- |
Part III: MARKET EQUILIBRIUM AND MARKET FAILURE |
| -- |
Introduction to Part III |
| -- |
10. Competitive Markets |
| -- |
A. Introduction |
| -- |
B. Pareto Optimality and Competitive Equilibria |
| -- |
C. Partial Equilibrium Competitive Analysis |
| -- |
D. The Fundamental Welfare Theorems in a Partial Equilibrium Context |
| -- |
E. Welfare Analysis in the Partial Equilibrium Model |
| -- |
F. Free-Entry and Long-Run Competitive Equilibria |
| -- |
G. Concluding Remarks on Partial Equilibrium Analysis |
| -- |
Exercises |
| -- |
11. Externalities and Public Goods |
| -- |
A. Introduction |
| -- |
B. A Simple Bilateral Externality |
| -- |
C. Public Goods |
| -- |
D. Multilateral Externalities |
| -- |
E. Private Information and Second-Best Solutions |
| -- |
Appendix: Non-Convexities and the Theory of Externalities |
| -- |
Exercises |
| -- |
12. Market Power |
| -- |
A. Introduction |
| -- |
B. Monopoly Pricing |
| -- |
C. Static Models of Oligopoly |
| -- |
D. Repeated Interaction |
| -- |
E. Entry |
| -- |
F. The Competitive Limit |
| -- |
G. Strategic Precommitments to Affect Future Competition |
| -- |
Appendix A: Infinitely Repeated Games and the Folk Theorem |
| -- |
Appendix B: Strategic Entry Deterrence and Accommodation |
| -- |
Exercises |
| -- |
13. Adverse Selection, Signalling, and Screening |
| -- |
A. Introduction |
| -- |
B. Informational Asymmetries and Adverse Selection |
| -- |
C. Signalling |
| -- |
D. Screening |
| -- |
Appendix: Reasonable-Beliefs Refinements in Signalling Games |
| -- |
Exercises |
| -- |
14. The Principal-Agent Problem |
| -- |
A. Introduction |
| -- |
B. Hidden Actions (Moral Hazard) |
| -- |
C. Hidden Information (and Monopolistic Screening) |
| -- |
D. Hidden Actions and Hidden Information: Hybrid Models |
| -- |
Appendix A: Multiple Effort Levels in the Hidden Action Model |
| -- |
Appendix B: A Formal Solution of the Principal-Agent Problem with Hidden Information |
| -- |
Exercises |
| -- |
Part IV: GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM |
| -- |
Introduction to Part IV |
| -- |
15. General Equilibrium Theory: Some Examples |
| -- |
A. Introduction |
| -- |
B. Pure Exchange: The Edgeworth Box |
| -- |
C. The One Consumer-One Producer Economy |
| -- |
D. The 2x2 Production Model |
| -- |
E. General versus Partial Equilibrium Theory |
| -- |
Exercises |
| -- |
16. Equilibrium and Its Basic Welfare Properties |
| -- |
A. Introduction |
| -- |
B. The Basic Model and Definitions |
| -- |
C. The First Fundamental Theorem of Welfare Economics |
| -- |
D. The Second Fundamental Theorem of Welfare Economics |
| -- |
E. Pareto Optimality and Social Welfare Optima |
| -- |
F. First-Order Conditions for Pareto Optimality |
| -- |
G. Some Applications |
| -- |
Appendix: Technical Properties of the Set of Feasible Allocations |
| -- |
Exercises |
| -- |
17. The Positive Theory of Equilibrium |
| -- |
A. Introduction |
| -- |
B. Equilibrium: Definitions and Basic Equations |
| -- |
C. Existence of Walrasian Equilibrium |
| -- |
D. Local Uniqueness and the Index Theorem |
| -- |
E. Anything Goes: The Sonnenschein-Mantel-Debreu Theorem |
| -- |
F. Uniqueness of Equilibria |
| -- |
G. Comparative Statics Analysis |
| -- |
H. Tatonnement Stability |
| -- |
I. Large Economies and Non-Convexities |
| -- |
Appendix A: Characterizing Equilibrium through Welfare Equations |
| -- |
Appendix B: A General Approach to the Existence of Walrasian Equilibrium |
| -- |
Exercises |
| -- |
18. Some Foundations for Competitive Equilibria |
| -- |
A. Introduction |
| -- |
B. Core and Equilibria |
| -- |
C. Non-Cooperative Foundations of Walrasian Equilibria |
| -- |
D. The Limits to Redistribution |
| -- |
E. Equilibrium and the Marginal Productivity Principle |
| -- |
Appendix: Cooperative Game Theory |
| -- |
Exercises |
| -- |
19. General Equilibrium under Uncertainty |
| -- |
A. Introduction |
| -- |
B. A Market Economy with Contingent Commodities: Description |
| -- |
C. Arrow-Debreu Equilibrium |
| -- |
D. Sequential Trade |
| -- |
E. Asset Markets |
| -- |
F. Incomplete Markets |
| -- |
G. Firm Behavior in General Equilibrium Models under Uncertainty |
| -- |
H. Imperfect Information |
| -- |
Exercises |
| -- |
20. Equilibrium and Time |
| -- |
A. Introduction |
| -- |
B. Intertemporal Utility |
| -- |
C. Intertemporal Production and Efficiency |
| -- |
D. Equilibrium: The One-Consumer Case |
| -- |
E. Stationary Programs, Interest Rates, and Golden Rules |
| -- |
F. Dynamics |
| -- |
G. Equilibrium: Several Consumers |
| -- |
H. Overlapping Generations |
| -- |
I. Remarks on Non-Equilibrium Dynamics: Tatonnement and Learning |
| -- |
Exercises |
| -- |
Part V: WELFARE ECONOMICS AND INCENTIVES |
| -- |
Introduction to Part V |
| -- |
21. Social Choice Theory |
| -- |
A. Introduction |
| -- |
B. A Special Case: Social Preferences over Two Alternatives |
| -- |
C. The General Case: Arrow's Impossibility Theorem |
| -- |
D. Some Possibility Results: Restricted Domains |
| -- |
E. Social Choice Functions |
| -- |
Exercises |
| -- |
22. Elements of Welfare Economics and Axiomatic Bargaining |
| -- |
A. Introduction |
| -- |
B. Utility Possibility Sets |
| -- |
C. Social Welfare Functions and Social Optima |
| -- |
D. Invariance Properties of Social Welfare Functions |
| -- |
E. The Axiomatic Bargaining Approach |
| -- |
F. Coalitional Bargaining: The Shapley Value |
| -- |
Exercises |
| -- |
23. Incentives and Mechanism Design |
| -- |
A. Introduction |
| -- |
B. The Mechanism Design Problem |
| -- |
C. Dominant Strategy Implementation |
| -- |
D. Bayesian Implementation |
| -- |
E. Participation Constraints |
| -- |
F. Optimal Bayesian Mechanisms |
| -- |
Appendix A: Implementation and Multiple Equilibria |
| -- |
Appendix B: Implementation in Environments with Complete Information |
| -- |
Exercises |
| -- |
Mathematical Appendix |
| -- |
A. Introduction |
| -- |
B. Homogeneous Functions and Euler's Formula |
| -- |
C. Concave and Quasiconcave Functions |
| -- |
D. Matrices: Negative (Semi)Definiteness and Other Properties |
| -- |
E. The Implicit Function Theorem |
| -- |
F. Continuous Functions and Compact Sets |
| -- |
G. Convex Sets and Separating Hyperplanes |
| -- |
H. Correspondences |
| -- |
I. Fixed Point Theorems |
| -- |
J. Unconstrained Maximization |
| -- |
K. Constrained Maximization |
| -- |
L. The Envelope Theorem |
| -- |
M. Linear Programming |
| -- |
N. Dynamic Programming |
| -- |
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